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FEARLESSLY SWIMMING UPSTREAM TO RISKY WATERS: 







We examine the puzzling geographic pattern that shows firms entering countries with weak 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection with their research and development (R&D) 
activities. Geographic entry into weak IPR protection countries is at odds with conventional 
wisdom as such an environment erodes a firm’s ability to appropriate from its innovations. We 
offer that while the well-established practice of spreading out a firm’s value chain activities 
across a region has important implications for value creation, what remains unaddressed is the 
value appropriation aspect of such activities. We introduce a multilevel theory and maintain that 
operating regionally through commercialization activities (downstream activities) provides 
complementary assets to the upstream activities—specifically R&D activities in a country within 
that region—with which focal firms can appropriate more from their innovations. We find that 
regional downstream commercialization activities can substitute for weak IPR regimes, thereby 
providing firms with an alternative mechanism for protecting their intellectual property in weak 
IPR countries.    
 
 
Keywords: geographic entry, complementarities, innovation, R&D, value appropriation, 








Innovation is a difficult process, demanding that firms keep pace with technological changes 
while avoiding overly repeating and exhausting recombinant opportunities (Fleming, 2001). 
Geographic entry into foreign markets through research and development (R&D) activities can 
allow firms to access global resources to assist in their innovation processes (Almeida, 1996; 
Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Doz and Wilson, 2012; Florida, 1997; Frost, 2001; Jaffe et al., 1993; 
Nelson, 1993; Patel and Vega, 1999; Pearce, 1999; Zhao, 2006). An analysis by Goldman Sachs 
offers economic evidence that the global distribution of research and scientific activity is 
shifting, suggesting a ‘changing and more global innovation landscape’ (Gilman, 2010, p. 3). As 
new hubs of innovative activity are emerging, and across a range of industries—including 
automotive, electronics, IT consulting and services, networking and communication devices, 
pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors—presents an opportunity for firms to rethink where they 
want to invest their innovative activities (Gilman, 2010). 
Recent instances of geographic entry into foreign countries through R&D activities by 
firms reflect the economic evidence. For example, Pfizer is investing $14 million in Chile to 
launch a Center of Excellence in Precision Medicine (CEPM), which will focus on developing 
new genome-based diagnostic technologies for cancer (Leask, 2015). Sylvia Varela, president of 
Pfizer Oncology for Latin America, explains ‘the work that will be done at CEPM will be on par 
with the best and most renowned research centers in the world’ (Leask, 2015). Apple is investing 
$1 billion in a new R&D center in Vietnam, joining the high-profile firms of Samsung 
Electronics, Hewlett-Packard, and Panasonic, which have made significant investments in R&D 
centers there as well (Maylay Mail Online, 2016; Tuyet, 2016). Intel chose Costa Rica to host its 
newest R&D ‘mega lab’, which will develop new smartphones, tablets, laptops, desktops, and 
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all-in-one computers for its global customers (Arias, 2015a, 2015b; Costa Rican Investment 
Promotion Agency, 2014).  
A primary reason for studying the role of geographic entry in innovation has been to 
understand how firms can use geographic entry as a source of value creation. Geographic entry 
into foreign markets can allow firms the opportunity to potentially access resources to fuel their 
innovative processes, including new and diverse sources of knowledge (Almeida, 1996; Frost, 
2001; Pearce, 1999), high-quality scientists, engineers, and designers (Florida, 1997; Zhao, 
2006), different national innovation systems (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; 
Patel and Vega, 1999) and knowledge spillovers (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Jaffe et al., 1993), 
many of which are only reachable by being in distinct, host locations (Birkinshaw, 2000; 
Cantwell, 1989; Dunning, 1998; Frost, 2001; Kogut, 1991). Returning to our aforementioned 
examples, a firm’s geographic entry into the foreign markets of Chile, Vietnam, or Costa Rica 
can offer location-specific advantages leading to enhanced value creation for the firm. 
However, the performance of a firm’s R&D investment is a joint function of value 
creation and value appropriation. In this light, what is striking about Chile, Vietnam, and Costa 
Rica is that they are all countries that do not have strong intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection. As R&D activities are subject to risks of knowledge leakage and threats of imitation 
from global exposure, firms may not be able to appropriate the economic return from the value 
they create in such countries (Teece, 1986). This makes the empirical patterns of geographic 
entry into the weak IPR protection countries all the more perplexing. Thus, in understanding the 
role of geographic entry in innovation there remains the unresolved question of how do firms 




In this paper, we seek an answer to this research question and attempt to explain the 
recent, puzzling geographic patterns that show firms entering their R&D activities into countries 
with weak IPR protection. Geographic entry into weak IPR countries is at odds with 
conventional wisdom as such an environment erodes firms’ ability to appropriate from their 
innovations. We combine the technology management literature’s complementary assets 
framework (Mitchell, 1989, 1991; Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997) with the international 
management literature’s regionalization theory and semiglobalization perspective (Ghemawat, 
2003, 2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004, 2007) to develop a new theoretical model of the role of 
geographic entry in innovation. Joining the two streams of theories not only helps us to address 
the research question but also results in explanatory power gains from the cross-fertilization, 
which facilitates a new exchange in a now shared conversation across the technology 
management and international management literatures.  
Toward this end, we first conceptualize geographic entry into a region as the regional 
configuration of complementary assets, or the geographic dispersion of a firm’s value chain 
activities across countries within a region. With this conceptualization, we offer that while the 
well-established practice of spreading out a firm’s value chain activities across a region has 
important implications for value creation, what remains unaddressed is the value appropriation 
aspect of such activities. We introduce a multilevel theory and maintain that operating regionally 
through commercialization activities (downstream activities) provides complementary assets to 
the upstream activities—specifically R&D activities in a country within that region—with which 
the focal firm can appropriate more from its innovations. More specifically, we develop a 
framework that suggests that commercialization activities in the region help firms develop a 
firm-specific value appropriation capability that allows them to appropriate more from their 
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innovation activities even in the countries within the region with weak IPR protections. We 
submit that regional downstream commercialization activities can substitute for weak IPR 
regimes, thereby providing the firm with an alternative mechanism for protecting its intellectual 
property in weak IPR countries.    
We test our theory using a dataset of innovative activity in the global pharmaceutical 
industry encompassing 142 multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in 118 countries within 
18 geographic regions. This dataset accounts for all of the sample firms’ drug commercialization 
activity and R&D activity worldwide. We employ a cross-classified multilevel analysis to 
simultaneously account for the firm, country, and regional levels of analysis and answers calls 
for more multilevel research (Arregle et al., 2006; Cheng et al., 2009; Hitt et al., 2007; Peterson 
et al., 2012).  
Our theory and findings contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we illuminate the 
role of geographic entry in innovation as the regional configuration of complementary assets 
from a value appropriation aspect. In doing so, we extend the extant literature on regionalization 
that has focused on the value creation aspect of complementary assets in creating values through 
the synergistic configuration. While important, the value creation aspect of the regional 
configuration of complementary assets may not be sufficient to address the puzzling pattern of 
R&D investments into weak IPR countries. For this, we shed new light on the aspect of 
complementary assets in appropriating values from the perspective of regionalization and 
maintain that the regional configuration of complementary assets can provide an alternative 
mechanism for firms to protect their intellectual property in countries within that region with 
weak IPR protection and thus substitute for weak IPR regimes. As there have been few attempts 
to study how entry decisions can impact firms’ subsequent behavior, this research directly 
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responds to the call in the literature for researchers to ‘cast a wider net than previous work on 
market entry…[with] more expansive research and theory’ (JMS Special Issue Call for Papers, 
2016). Our study provides evidence between geographic entry and firms’ subsequent innovative 
behavior.  
Second, we offer novel insights and contribute to the understanding of a relevant 
contemporary phenomenon—globalization. More specifically, our findings offer important 
nuances in understanding that despite the flood of exposure directed toward globalization 
through both the academic and popular press, firms’ activities remain highly regionalized, 
making globalization semi at best. This research extends the work by regionalization scholars by 
showing a novel mechanism enabling and reinforcing the phenomenon of regionalization. More 
specifically, extending previous research that tends to exhibit path-dependency between similar 
activities, the current study shows that one set of a firm’s activities act as a catalyst in igniting a 
different set of activities, thereby encompassing a more comprehensive set of activities in the 
region and thus reinforcing the process toward regionalization. We detail the theoretical 
mechanisms through which this influence occurs and offer an explanation for why firms that 
organize regionally could have greater breadth in activities, as such activities also benefit from 
cross-fertilization. We contribute new insights into how geographic regions may influence 
various firm activities—above and beyond what considering only countries can explain.  
Finally, we make a methodological contribution to the management literature by 
proposing a cross-classified multilevel analysis for studying firms’ geographic entry decisions. 
Countries nest within regions; however, MNEs move across country and regional borders 
seeking location-specific advantages. The cross-classified multilevel approach, unlike the 
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traditional nested approach, can properly capture the mobility of MNCs across countries and 
regions, one of the fundamental building blocks of many theories in international business.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this research, our attention is on examining the role of geographic entry in innovation. We 
focus on geographic entry through the components of the value chain and, more specifically, 
through the upstream (R&D processes) and downstream (commercialization processes) 
activities, as innovation includes not only the R&D processes but also the commercialization 
processes in the launch of new products (Kim and Pennings, 2009). Scholars have applied the 
upstream/downstream framework to innovation research on strategic alliances (Baum et al., 
2000; Koza and Lewin, 1998) as well as to intellectual human capital (Hess and Rothaermel, 
2011). We believe that upstream/downstream framework is relevant in the current study, as we 
are investigating firms’ R&D entry into countries with weak IPR protection from the perspective 
of downstream complementary assets.  
Regionalization Theory and the Semiglobalization Perspective 
The region construct, defined as a grouping of countries in geographic proximity, offers new 
understanding as to how firms profit and has gained distinction in both international management 
and strategy literatures (Arregle et al., 2009; Arregle et al., 2013; Buckley and Ghauri, 2004; 
Cantwell, 2009; Dunning, 1998; Flores and Aguilera, 2007; Ghemawat, 2001, 2003, 2005; Kim 
and Aguilera, 2015; Rugman and Verberke, 2004, 2007, inter alia). To situate the theoretical 
positioning and importance of the region construct in the literature, we return to theories of the 
MNE. In one of the most seminal works on the theory of the MNE, Buckley and Casson (1976, 
p. 32) state a core premise that framed their theory as ‘firms maximize profit in a world of 
imperfect markets’. In this global context, ‘it is the combination of the exchange and the value-
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adding functions that will determine a firm’s profitability’ (Dunning, 2003, p. 109, italics in 
original).  
Scholarly work on the exchange function identifies specific hazards that come with cross-
border contractual and market failures. It is because of these failures that firms internalize their 
exchanges across countries (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1981; Dunning and Lundan, 
2008; Rugman, 1981; Teece, 1975, 1981). In contrast, value adding functions are less about 
transaction costs economized through internalization and more about ‘the common 
(organizational) culture of an integrated enterprise and the ease of coordination inside the firm, 
as compared with coordination through the market’ (Teece, 2014, p. 10). MNEs invest across 
countries in both exchange and value adding functions to maximize profitability (Dunning, 
2003). Moreover, ‘even if transaction costs were zero… learning, co-creation, and orchestration 
functions would still need to be carried out… [and the] MNE is a vehicle designed to do so’ 
(Teece, 2014, p. 22). As such, contemporary theories of the MNE view it as ‘an island of (non-
market) resource allocation orchestrated to enhance learning, value creation, know-how transfer, 
and value capture’ (Teece, 2014, p. 22).  
Recent scholarly work on investments by MNEs into imperfect regional markets offers 
fresh insights into theories of the MNE. More specifically, investments by MNEs into regions 
constitute a critical research area in the strategy literature and in the international management 
literature on location choices. Regionalization theory argues that firms can take advantage of 
geographic, cultural, administrative, and economic proximity within regions (Ghemawat, 2005). 
Moreover, ‘these four factors are interrelated: Countries that are relatively close to one another 
are also likely to share commonalities along other dimensions…those similarities have 
intensified in the past few decades through free trade agreements, regional trade preferences and 
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tax treaties, and even currency unification’ (Ghemawat, 2005, p.100). Thus the benefits offered 
by regions are not just the sum of the countries within a region as the shared commonalities 
create synergies thereby elevating regional benefits further (Flores and Aguilera, 2007; 
Ghemawat, 2003; 2005; Kim and Aguilera, 2015; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004; 2007, inter alia).  
Similarly, recent economic evidence regarding the economic integration of markets 
reveals a state of incomplete market integration called semiglobalization, where markets are not 
completely isolated or completely integrated across borders (Ghemawat, 2003). The perspective 
of semiglobalization offers a challenge to the conversation currently held in both the academic 
literature and that of the popular press on globalization (Cairncross, 2001; Friedman, 1999, 
2005), including the ‘flat’ world perspective (Friedman, 2005). Semiglobalization scholars argue 
that regions, as an intermediate degree of globalization, offer distinctive benefits to firms 
because the world’s markets are imperfectly integrated across geographies (Ghemawat 2003, 
2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004, 2007). 
Further empirical evidence corroborates regionalization and semiglobalization. Rugman 
and Verbeke (2004) studied the activities of the 500 largest MNEs and found very few to be 
operating globally; rather, they found strong support of regionalization. Rugman (2005) offers 
more evidence that almost all MNEs are ‘regional’ rather than ‘global’. Arregle et al. (2009) 
confirm a regional value adding effect on the foreign subsidiary location decisions of Japanese 
MNEs. More specifically, they determine that a firm’s prior foreign subsidiary activity at the 
regional level determines the number of subsequent foreign subsidiaries in a country. The 
authors explain this finding as MNEs seeking regional agglomeration and arbitrage benefits 
between countries in the same region. Research by Arregle et al. (2013) also draws on the value 
adding function and demonstrates that MNEs’ prior investments in a region impact their future 
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investments to countries within that region. In other words, it is easier to redeploy prior 
investments made in a region to countries within the region (intra-region) rather than across 
regions (inter-region). Thus, these studies confirm regionalization and semiglobalization and the 
need for reaching beyond country-level analyses to include regional-level analyses for a more 
representative and comprehensive perspective of firms’ strategic processes (Arregle et al., 2009; 
Arregle et al., 2013; Ghemawat, 2003, 2005; Qian, et al., 2013; Rugman, 2005; Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2004, 2007).  
Regionalization and semiglobalization advance the literature’s theories of the MNE. 
Understanding how firms operate regionally offers a new dimension to the answer to how ‘firms 
maximize profit in a world of imperfect markets’ (Buckley and Casson, 1976, p. 32). Moreover, 
regionalization offers fresh insights into the two functions—exchange and value adding—which 
determine a firm’s profitability (Dunning, 2003, p. 109). Recent research on the regional value 
adding effect makes an important contribution to literature in understanding how firms maximize 
profit across imperfect markets (Arregle et al., 2009; Arregle et al., 2013). However, maximizing 
profit requires consideration not only of value creation aspects but also of value appropriation 
aspects (Kim, 2016). To our knowledge, no research to date has evaluated the value 
appropriation considerations of regionalization. Thus, regionalization and semiglobalization open 
up an additional area of research that requires new theorizing, new mechanisms, and new 
statistical techniques to account for country-level and regional-level analyses. In this research, 
we attempt to address the gap in regionalization on value appropriation. More specifically, we 
argue that the geographic dispersion of value creating complementary assets allows for value 





The Complementary Assets Framework 
In his seminal paper, Teece (1986) addresses key strategic issues surrounding the appropriation of 
technological innovations. He offers that there are two ways for firms to appropriate the value of 
their innovations. First, he argues that downstream complementary assets (DCAs)—the assets 
dedicated to ‘marketing, competitive manufacturing, and after-sales support’—help the possessor 
to appropriate the value created by those products (p. 288). Second, Teece also argues that the 
appropriability regime, or IPR protection of an environment, has an impact on the ability of 
innovators to appropriate the value from their technological innovations. One of the insightful 
points Teece makes in this groundbreaking paper is that the abovementioned two mechanisms are 
in a substitutional relationship. The substitutional relationship identifies that when the legal 
protection of IPR is weak, an alternative mechanism is required for innovators to profit from their 
innovations (Teece, 1986). Therefore, when the appropriability regime is strong (where the 
innovation has an institutional protection), ‘firms could rely on licensing and other contractual 
arrangements to extract rents from their innovation without access to such assets’ (Pisano, 2006, 
p.1123). Thus, the substitutional relationship underscores that the two mechanisms are intrinsically 
interdependent such that one cannot separate the DCAs from the IPR environment in which they 
are operating (Teece, 1986). To put it another way, to correctly understand the implications of the 
DCAs, one must also understand the IPR environment.  
In developing our theory further, we now turn to the complementary assets framework, 
derived from Teece’s (1986) pioneering paper (Mitchell, 1989, 1991; Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997). 
The framework provides a larger theoretical base that we use to conceptualize geographic entry 
into a region as the regional configuration of complementary assets. The framework posits that in 
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studying the innovation process, placing so much emphasis on the upstream activities (such as 
R&D) overlooks the downstream activities (such as commercialization). Yet, it is in the 
downstream activities where firms actually appropriate the value for their R&D efforts. Profitably 
engaging in upstream activities requires the development of downstream complementary assets 
such as specialized distribution channels and dedicated sales and service operations. As Teece 
explains, ‘[i]n almost all cases, the successful commercialization of an innovation requires that the 
know-how in question be utilized in conjunction with other capabilities or assets’ (1986, p. 288).  
Teece (1986) differentiates between DCAs as generic, specialized, and co-specialized, 
determined by how specific the DCAs are to the innovation. The complementary assets 
framework focuses on specialized and co-specializedi DCAs, recognizing that although these 
assets build over time and are expensive to develop, commercializing with them is more valuable 
to the firm and can translate to a unique advantage, a barrier to imitation and a way to 
appropriate from innovation (Mitchell, 1989, 1991; Rumelt, 1984; Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997).  
Research on DCAs for value appropriation has been vibrant. For example, Mitchell’s 
(1991) work in the medical diagnostic imaging industry indicates that firms that commercialize 
their technological innovation with specialized DCAs achieve greater performance, measured in 
both market share and survival, thereby supporting the value appropriation aspect of 
complementary assets. Similarly, Tripsas (1997) investigates the role of specialized DCAs, and 
specifically, that of a specialized manufacturing capability, a sales and service network, and a 
font library in the typesetting industry. She concludes that the firm’s ability to appropriate the 
benefits from its technological innovations through specialized DCAs plays a critical role in its 
performance. Supporting this argument further is Polidoro’s (2013) work that shows that firms 
that actively build up their DCA of a well-established reputation, obtained through third-party 
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certifications, will thwart competition from rivals, thereby allowing the firm to appropriate more 
value from its innovations. Likewise, Wu et al. (2014) highlight the importance of DCAs as 
powerful resources (pipes) that can be used to appropriate value from firms’ technological 
innovations. The authors elucidate that during the transition to digital photography, Kodak 
leveraged its film-based complementary assets to maximize its returns across its innovations. 
More specifically, by using its strong network of retail relationships, ‘Kodak was able to 
persuade many retailers to add the Photo CD system to their photofinishing facilities’ (p. 1262). 
Moreover, Kodak also promoted retailers’ adoption of their APS system, producing higher 
quality prints and self-service kiosks. Thus, Kodak’s DCAs were supporting both its digital and 
print innovations, assuring that ‘Kodak would still be able to make money from consumables 
like photo paper and services’ (p. 1262). 
 It is well-documented in the literature that in addition to the value appropriation aspect 
of complementary assets, there exists the synergistic- and thus value creation aspect of 
complementary assets. Complementarity not only brings greater appropriation but also brings 
opportunities for synergies, ii where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. For example, 
Arora and Gambardella (1990) find that a firm that uses external linkages to assist in combining 
upstream and downstream areas of the value chain creates complementarities for itself and, 
moreover, if the external links access distinct knowledge, the links are synergistic to one another. 
Helfat (1997) finds that when firms need to augment their upstream R&D, it is those with greater 
DCAs that carry out more upstream R&D activity, crediting the effect to complementarity in the 
value chain. Hess and Rothaermel (2011) find that integrating upstream knowledge from star 
scientists with downstream alliances draws complementarities by linking knowledge from one 
segment of the value chain to another. Ceccaggnoli et al. (2010) find downstream activities with 
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high levels of co-specialized complementary assets to be complementary to upstream R&D 
activities.  
Regionalization as Configuration of Complementary Assets 
In the Introduction, we define geographic entry into a region as the regional configuration of 
complementary assets, or the geographic dispersion of a firm’s value chain activities across 
countries within a region. As the main focus of our paper is value appropriation, we center on 
downstream activities (commercialization activities)—the complements to upstream activities 
(R&D activities)—in consideration of their substitutional relationship with the IPR regime.  
Building on the aforementioned research, DCAs help innovators appropriate the value 
from their innovations. Co-specialized DCAs—those most specific to the innovation—can 
include idiosyncratic manufacturing knowledge and facilities, regulatory knowledge, a dedicated 
sales force with a strong network of relationships, and an established reputation (Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002; Mitchell, 1989, 1991; Stieglitz and Heine, 2007; Teece, 1986). In addition to 
being specific to the innovation, co-specialized DCAs can be specific to particular locations, and 
consequently are useful only in a restricted range of environments (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). 
As expounded in the literature of regionalization, the upstream activities and the downstream 
activities in the context of regionalization tend to be bilaterally specialized (Ghemawat, 2005). 
As such, the investment of downstream activities into a region is understood as the regional 
configuration of co-specialized DCAs.  
 Returning now to the insightful point that Teece (1986) delineates in his paper, we 
advance our main thesis that the regional configuration of co-specialized DCAs is in a 
substitutional relationship with the IPR environment. More specifically, when operating in a 
weak IPR protection environment, firms must have an alternative means to protect their IPR and 
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require strong co-specialized DCAs. On the flip side, when operating in a strong IPR protection 
environment, an alternative mechanism may not be required (Pisano, 2006; Teece, 1986). In 
summary, because the co-specialized DCAs and the IPR environment in which they are 
operating in are so intrinsically intertwined, any implications of value appropriation must take 
into account the two mechanisms simultaneously.  
HYPOTHESES 
Before we advance our hypotheses on the value appropriation aspects of the regional 
configuration of co-specialized DCAs, we discuss their value creation implications as the 
performance implications of an R&D investment is a joint function of value creation and value 
appropriation. 
Co-specialized DCAs and Value Creation 
Aggregation and arbitrage possibilities across the region through the regional configuration of 
co-specialized DCAs extend to the firm an expanded geography for value creation opportunities. 
Regions offer shared commonalities as the physical continuity and proximity limits their 
diversity; yet they enjoy economic cooperation, essential historic ties, government support, and 
institutional and cultural similarity across countries (Ghemawat, 2003, 2005, 2007; Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2004, 2005, 2007). Geographic proximity is a key factor for growing regionalization; 
spatial aspects to the transmission of information and knowledge in economic exchange have 
long been recognized (Buckley and Ghauri, 2004; Ghemawat, 2001, 2003, 2005; Rugman and 
Verberke, 2004). Geographic proximity also plays an important role in opportunity identification 
and evaluation, and is particularly important in the transmission of ‘soft’ information,iii which 
transmits through relationships in a local geographic area (Petersen, 2004; Petersen and Rajan, 
2002). The influence of geographic proximity on investment opportunity decisions has been 
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demonstrated in mutual fund (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001), venture capital (Sorenson and 
Stuart, 2001), alliance (Reuer and Lahiri, 2013), and acquisition investments (Chakrabarti and 
Mitchell, 2013). Thus, the firm’s presence in the region through its regional configuration of co-
specialized DCAs allows it to exploit regional synergies and differences. As such, a region has 
important implications for value creation and is well established (Arregle et al., 2009; Arregle et 
al., 2013).   
Co-specialized DCAs and Value Appropriation 
While important, the value creation aspect of the regional configuration of co-specialized DCAs 
may not be sufficient to address the puzzling patterns of R&D investments into weak IPR 
countries. Theory dictates that maximizing profit requires consideration not only of value 
creation aspects but also of value appropriation aspects. Teece explicates the value appropriation 
aspect of complementary assets in his (1986) generative work. Moreover, regionalization theory 
and the semiglobalization perspective offer a new dimension to answer the question of how 
‘firms maximize profit in a world of imperfect markets’ (Buckley and Casson, 1976, p. 32). 
Accordingly, if the regional configuration of co-specialized DCAs matters for value creation, 
what is the value appropriation aspect of such activities? 
Our clubbing together the two streams of theories from the technology management 
literature’s complementary assets framework (Mitchell, 1989, 1991; Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997) 
with the international management literature’s regionalization theory and semiglobalization 
perspective (Ghemawat, 2003, 2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004, 2007) offers two new insights 
into the value appropriation aspect of the regional configuration of co-specialized DCAs. First, 
the regional commonalities and consequent regional nature of firms’ operations enable firms to 
link their upstream and downstream activities located in different counties within a region. This 
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linkage is necessary to realize the complementarities between the upstream activities and the 
downstream activities with which the firm can appropriate the value it creates in the region. 
Second, regionalization implies that the DCAs are dispersed regionally, which makes them 
difficult for competitors to replicate. Together, these two insights underscore that the regional 
configuration of co-specialized DCAs enables firms to develop a firm-specific value 
appropriation capability with which they can better appropriate the value they create through the 
innovation process. We now discuss in more detail the mechanisms behind these two insights. 
Teece’s (1986) motivation in his seminal paper was to provide a theoretical foundation to 
understanding the real world frustration experienced by innovators who are unable to appropriate 
from their technological innovations. He offers that in most cases in order for innovators to profit 
from their upstream activities they must also develop downstream complementary assets. He 
details the importance of linking the upstream activities with the downstream activities for value 
appropriation. By applying his insights to the regional context, we maintain that regionalization 
theory and the semiglobalization perspective provide the theoretical foundation to better 
understanding the geographic space in which the link between the upstream activities and the 
downstream activities is established. The shared commonalities within a region provides 
opportunities for regional aggregation and arbitrage, making it more likely for the firms to 
organize their value creating activities to be more connected within a region (intra-region) than 
across regions (inter-region) (Ghemawat, 2003, 2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004, 2007). These 
linked value creating activities within the region would, in turn, provide the value appropriation 
mechanisms with which the firms can capture the value they create through innovations. In sum, 
the two streams of theories together delineate how the upstream activities and the downstream 
activities, located in different countries within a region, work in tandem for value appropriation.    
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In addition to providing the geographic space in which the link between the upstream 
activities and the downstream activities is established, regions also provide an additional 
advantage for value appropriation. As Teece (1986) explains, the harder it is for competitors to 
replicate the DCAs, the bigger the advantage to the innovator. Consistent with the theoretical 
arguments proposed above regarding value creation, by operating regionally the firm likely has 
its co-specialized DCAs labyrinthically spread out over multiple countries in its efforts to exploit 
regional synergies and differences. One of the important mechanisms behind the regional 
configuration of co-specialized DCAs as a source of value appropriation is the geographic 
dispersion of DCAs across countries within the region. Co-specialized DCAs labyrinthically 
spread out over multiple countries increases the causal ambiguity and uniqueness of the firm’s 
activities and assets, and thus creates greater barriers to their imitation (Kim, 2013). 
To this point more specifically, locating all the co-specialized DCAs in a country would 
be ideal to maximize the benefit from the synergistic facet and thus value creating aspect of 
DCAs from the complementary asset framework (AMR Working paper – Lampert and Kim, 
2018). However, collocating all the value creating co-specialized DCAs in a country would make 
them vulnerable to potential imitation, thus limiting the opportunity to appropriate the value 
created through the innovation activities (Teece, 1986), because ‘[v]alue appropriation 
presupposes that the owner can exclude non-owners from using or destroying attributes to which 
he holds property rights’ (Foss and Foss, 2005: 544, italics in original). As such, geographic 
dispersion of the co-specialized DCAs across multiple countries will help firms prevent 
imitation, since it will increase causal ambiguity and uniqueness and thus create isolating 
mechanisms (Kim, 2016; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Rumelt, 
1984). However, dispersing the co-specialized DCAs all over the world may not be ideal since 
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this would make it difficult to reap the synergies between the co-specialized DCAs that are too 
far away from each other. Therefore, we posit that regionalization can be an ideal compromise 
between these two countervailing forces. More specifically, on the one hand, pure domestic 
configuration may be ideal for synergy but not for capturing it exclusively. On the other hand, 
full globalization may be optimal for preventing imitation but not for synergies as it incurs non-
trivial costs including searching and coordination (Grant, 1996; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). In 
fact, the foregoing discussion can provide a new and complementing explanation for the 
prevalent patterns of regionalization rather than globalization found by many studies. Namely, as 
performance of an R&D investment is a joint function of value creation and value appropriation, 
regionalization could provide an ideal extent of geographic scope for internationalization where 
firms can incorporate the two countervailing forces: the need for geographic proximity to enjoy 
value creation from the co-specialized DCAs versus the need for geographic dispersion to 
appropriate the value created through innovations. 
So, how do co-specialized DCAs in a region help firms to develop a firm-specific value 
appropriation capability and thus appropriate more from their innovation activities? We maintain 
the regional configuration of co-specialized DCAs enables firms to develop a firm-specific value 
appropriation capability with which they can better appropriate the value they create through the 
innovation process. This capability is firm specific because the configuration is idiosyncratic to 
the firm organized in the region. The firm-specific value appropriation capability makes it 
difficult for competitors to imitate, providing temporal monopoly of the firm’s innovation. The 
longer firms can impede their competitors, the longer they sustain their competitive advantage 
(Kim, 2013). Therefore, we expect that firms with prior commercialization activity in a region 
will show a higher willingness to engage their R&D activities in a country within that region as 
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their regional configuration of co-specialized DCAs affords them a greater ability to appropriate 
more from their innovations. Based on the preceding discussion, we predict the following 
baseline hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s prior commercialization activity in a region positively 
relates to its R&D activity in a country within that region.  
The Appropriability Regime 
As we previously advanced in our theoretical background section, the complementary assets 
framework argues that the appropriability regime, or IPR protection of an environment, also has 
an impact on the ability of innovators to appropriate their technological innovations (Teece, 
1986). When the appropriability regime is strong (where the innovation has protection), ‘firms 
could rely on licensing and other contractual arrangements to extract rents from their innovation 
without access to such assets’ (Pisano, 2006, p.1123). However, when the legal protection of IPR 
is weak, complementary assets are required for innovators to profit from their innovations 
(Teece, 1986). In other words, when operating in an environment with weak IPR protection, 
firms must have an alternative means to protect their IPR. In short, ‘strategy is contingent on the 
appropriability regime’ (Pisano, 2006, p. 1123).  
When investing in R&D activities in foreign countries with weak IPR protection, and 
where misappropriation hazards are high, firms can substitute the weak IPR protection with their 
firm-specific value appropriation capability. In other words, for environments with weak IPR 
protection, the firm-specific value appropriation capability can serve as an alternative 
mechanism to capture the economic returns from innovation for a firm. Consequently, the firm’s 
R&D activities in countries within the region with weak IPR protection can benefit more from its 
regional configuration of co-specialized DCAs, as there is more potential for the downstream 
activity in the region to compensate for the countries’ weak IPR protection. We therefore expect 
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that the positive effect we predict in our first hypothesis, where firms with prior 
commercialization activity in a region will show a higher willingness to engage their R&D 
activities in a country within that region as their regional configuration of co-specialized DCAs 
affords them a greater ability to appropriate more from their innovations, will be stronger for 
those focal host countries within the region in which IPR protection is weak. The preceding 
discussion leads to the research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. A firm’s prior commercialization activity in a region can substitute 
for IPR protection. More specifically, we expect that the effect of a firm’s regional 
commercialization activity on its R&D activity in a country within that region to 
be greater in the countries with weaker IPR protection. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
We test our hypotheses with a longitudinal dataset on the innovative activities of 142 leading 
firms from the global pharmaceutical industry during the time period of 1997 to 2006. The global 
pharmaceutical industry is an ideal setting for this research because: (i) it is a decidedly global 
industry; (ii) it deals with innovation and has the need to protect IP; and (iii) it has international 
commercialization and R&D activities. As such, it is an industry in which relevant aspects of our 
theory are empirically observable.  
We identified the leading players in the global pharmaceutical industry by compiling lists 
published annually by private research companies such as IMS Health, the industry’s trade 
associations such as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, popular press 
outlets such as Forbes, and the industry’s trade journals such as Pharmaceutical Executive. We 
include divisions and subsidiaries with parent firms using Who Owns Whom (published by GAP 
Books in association with Dun & Bradstreet), The Directory of Corporate Affiliations, 
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LexisNexis, and the specific firm’s website. We confirmed the involvement of each firm in active 
drug discovery and development and excluded any not active or focused on reformulations or 
generics. Our global sample includes firms with headquarters in 18 countries.  
As noted in our theoretical background section above, a region is defined as a grouping of 
countries in geographic proximity (Ghemawat 2003, 2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004; 2005; 
2007, inter alia). We follow up the construct of a region with the empirical measure provided by 
Arregle et al. (2009, p. 88, italics added) with a ‘geographical conceptualization of a region, in 
which the physical continuity and proximity among countries of the grouping is emphasized.’ 
Likewise, the geographical definition of a region and its emphasis on physical continuity and 
proximity is accentuated in the literature for how firms organize their international strategy 
(Buckley and Ghauri, 2004; McNamara and Vaaler, 2000; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004, 2007), 
and how doing so promotes increasing trade, investment linkages, and convergence in practices 
(Ghemawat, 2001, 2003, 2007; Khanna et al., 2006). We define our regions using the United 
Nations Statistics Division’s (UNSD) region classification system.iv Our use of this classification 
is consistent with empirical research on semiglobalization (Arregle et al., 2009; Arregle et al., 
2013). For information on firms’ commercialization and R&D activities, we utilize the 
AdisInsight database (Danzon et al., 2005; Girotra et al., 2007). Our dataset includes location 
information on every commercialization and R&D project for our sample of firms, worldwide. 
We also use the Liu and La Croix (2015) index of property rights in pharmaceutical inventions—
the Pharmaceutical IP Protection (PIPP) Index. We employ Compustat, annual reports, and trade 
publications to obtain financial data.  
To ensure appropriate understanding of geographic entry and innovation from the 
practitioner’s perspective, we complement our archival data efforts with interviews of global 
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pharmaceutical scientists and executives, FDA administrators, and health care providers 
including doctors and pharmacists. The interview process is critical to our thinking of how to 
approach the study. Our sample firms were operating in 118 countries across 18 regions. Table 
AI in the Appendix lists the countries and their regions. 
As done in past management studies of geographic entry into foreign markets, we take a 
five-year window approach and choose to use two periods (1997–2001 and 2002–2006) to assess 
the variables (e.g. Arregle et al., 2009; Arregle et al., 2013). That is, we assess our independent 
variables during the early period and measure our dependent variable during the later period. 
This accounts for the length of time it takes for firms to develop new R&D activities in a foreign 
host country, and matches what we saw coming from the interview process. As a robustness 
check, a three-year window approach also yielded consistent results. We also removed 
observations in each firm’s home country and home region. 
Dependent Variable 
R&D activity of a firm in a country. We use the AdisInsight database to obtain geographic entry 
into foreign markets, or internationalization, information on our sample firms’ R&D projects. 
The R&D process includes all projects across discovery (preclinical) steps and development 
(clinical) steps (Girotra et al., 2007; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Hill and Rang, 2012; Sosa, 
2009, 2011). Figure 1 provides a schematic illustration of the R&D (upstream) and 
commercialization (downstream) activities in the global pharmaceutical industry. We incorporate 
all projects across all the steps that comprise the R&D process including the preclinical step, 
along with the three clinical steps of phases I, II, and III. We measure the geographic entry of 
R&D activity of a firm in a country as a binary indicator where 0 indicates no geographic entry 
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of R&D activity in a particular country and 1 indicates that the firm had geographic entry of 
R&D activity in that country.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Independent Variables 
Prior commercialization activity of a firm in a region. To test the influence that a firm’s prior 
commercialization activity in a region has on a firm’s subsequent internationalization of R&D 
activity in a foreign host country in that region, we again use the AdisInsight dataset. To measure 
whether the firm had commercialization activities in a region, we observe if the focal firm had 
launched a drug in the region. We take a dichotomous approach in the construction of this 
variable because we theorize on the implications of the presence of the prior commercialization 
activity, not on the implications of the changes in the extent of prior commercialization activity. 
We create a variable equal to 1 if the firm had launched a drug in the region in the prior period, 0 
otherwise.  
Intellectual property right protection. We use Liu and La Croix’s (2015) cross-country index of 
IP rights—the Pharmaceutical IP Protection Index (PIPP)—to assess the intellectual property 
rights protection in a region. This index is appropriate to test our hypotheses because it is used 
specifically to measure protection in pharmaceutical inventions. It is a comprehensive index that 
‘incorporates five types of property rights in pharmaceuticals; six statutory measures of 
enforcement; and adherence to three international agreements providing for the grant and 
enforcement of rights to foreigners’ (Liu and La Croix, 2015, p. 206). We first weight the 
original PIPP index with each country’s region-relative gross domestic product (GDP) in order to 
take into account the country’s economic importance in the region (Arregle et al., 2013; Hejazi, 
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2007). We then calculate the regional-level variable as a mean of the GDP-weighted PIPP 
indices of the countries in the region. Higher levels of the index indicate more IPR protection 
and lower appropriation hazards.  
Control Variables 
We control for a number of firm-, regional-, and country-level variables: first, firm size, 
measured as the natural log of firm assets; second, firm’s slack resources, measured as the 
current ratio—the firm’s current assets divided by their current liabilities; third, firm’s R&D 
intensity (Arregle et al., 2013); and fourth, firm’s total R&D activity, which we measure as the 
number of drug discovery and development activities of the firm.  
We also control for three variables that account for the firm’s prior experience at the 
regional- and country-levels (Arregle et al., 2013; Lu, 2002): first, whether the firm engaged in 
commercialization during the prior period in a particular country; second, whether the firm 
engaged in R&D activity in the prior period in a particular country, which is a lagged dependent 
variable; and third, whether the firm engaged in R&D activity overall in the region during the 
prior period. These three variables also control for potential sequences or entry orders between 
R&D activities and commercialization activities. 
Finally, we control for four country-level variables: first, the patenting activity of a 
country, employing  the natural logarithm of the number of patent applications in the country 
(World Bank, 2015), which represents the overall R&D activity within the country even beyond 
the pharmaceutical industry; second, the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in the country 
to determine the potential desire to capture R&D benefits in fast-growing countries (Arregle et 
al., 2013); and third, a country’s total R&D activity of the pharmaceutical industry in that 
country employing the number of drug discovery and development activities in the country, to 
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account for countries that have a higher base rate of pharmaceutical knowledge. Table I lists the 
constructs and measurements. We lagged commercialization activities, R&D activities, R&D 
intensity, and firm size variables in order to appropriately capture the causal relationship. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table I about here 
------------------------------- 
Analysis 
We use cross-classified, multilevel logistic regression to analyze firms’ decisions to enter into 
R&D activity in each country within a region. We use logistic regression because the dependent 
variable is binary. We use multilevel models with four levels as the data exhibit firm-, regional-, 
and country-level clustering; failure to account for such clustering typically leads to spuriously 
precise regression coefficients and incorrect inferences (Goldstein, 2011; Raudenbush and Bryk, 
2002; Snijders and Bosker, 2012). We specify cross-classified rather than traditional hierarchical 
multilevel models as each firm operates across multiple countries and regions rather than being 
nested within a single country and region (Leckie, 2013). More specifically, as shown in Figure 
2, unlike countries that are nested within regions, firms can invest not only in their home 
countries and regions (e.g., Firms 1 and 3) but also in other countries outside their home regions 
(e.g., Firms 2 and 4).  Maximum likelihood estimation of these models is computationally 
infeasible; therefore, we fit all models by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. See 
Appendix A for further details.  
------------------------------- 





Table II provides descriptive statistics and correlations. We test for multicollinearity between our 
independent variables using variance inflation factors and a condition number. The mean 
variance inflation factor is 1.70 and the highest individual value is 2.77—both below the cutoff 
of 10 (Cohen et al., 2013). The condition number in our sample with our independent variables 
was 8.60, well below the cutoff of 30 (Cohen et al., 2013). These tests indicate that there is no 
evidence that multicollinearity might have affected the analysis. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table II about here 
------------------------------- 
 We provide the results of our cross-classified multilevel logistic regression models in 
Table III. Model 1 of Table III shows the results for a set of control variables only. Models 2 and 
3 provide results to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table III about here 
------------------------------- 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that prior commercialization activity of a firm in a region would 
positively relate to subsequent R&D activity within a focal host country within that region. The 
results in Model 2 of Table III show that there is not a statistically significant positive 
relationship (β = 0.03, n.s.). Thus, there is no support for Hypothesis 1. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that the positive effect of prior commercialization activity in a 
region will be stronger when IPR regime is weak. To test this hypothesis, we first create a 
region-relative GDP-weighted PIPP by subtracting the GDP-weighted PIPP of regions from that 
of countries. We then split the sample into four groups using the quartiles of the region-relative 
GDP-weighted PIPP and specify an interaction term between the quartile groups and the prior 
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commercialization activity in a region.v Model 3 shows the results for the interaction analysis. 
The results reveal a positive relationship between the effect of prior commercialization in a 
region in the first quartile group (Q1) (i.e., the lower 25% with the weakest IPR) (β = 0.37, p < 
0.10), suggesting that the effect of prior commercialization activity in a region is positive in the 
countries with the weakest IPR. More specifically, in the first quartile group, presence of a firm’s 
prior commercialization activities in a region would change the odds that the firm has R&D 
activities in a country within the region by a factor of 1.45. The coefficient of the interaction 
term with the second quartile group (Q2) is negative but is not statistically significant (β = −0.09, 
n.s.), suggesting that the effect of prior commercialization activity in the second quartile group is 
smaller than that of the first quartile group, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Lastly, the coefficients of the interaction terms with the third and fourth quartile groups (Q3 and 
Q4) are negative and statistically significant (β = −0.61, p < 0.05), suggesting that the effects of 
prior commercialization activity in the third and fourth quartile groups (i.e., the higher 50%−75% 
and 75%−100% with the high and highest IPR, respectively) are smaller than that of the first 
quartile group with statistically significant differences. More specifically, in the third and fourth 
quartile groups, respectively, presence of a firm’s prior commercialization activities in a region 
would change the odds that the firm has R&D activities in a country within the region by a factor 
of 0.79.  In sum, the results of the interaction analysis in Model 3 support Hypothesis 2 in that 
the effect of prior commercialization activity in a region is positive in the countries with the 
weakest IPR and becomes smaller as the IPR regime becomes tighter, corroborating the 
substitution effect between the IPR regime and firm-specific appropriation capability. 
 The nonsupport for Hypothesis 1 could be due to the intrinsic moderating effect of the 
IPR protection on the relationship between a firm’s prior commercialization activity in a region 
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and its R&D activity in a country. The coefficients of the interaction terms in Model 3 of Table 
III become smaller and eventually turn negative as the IPR protection level increases. This 
pattern of changes in the coefficients of the interaction terms suggests that marginal effects of the 
prior commercialization activity could have different signs across the four quartile groups. As 
such, when put together in Model 2 of Table III without considering the implications of changing 
marginal effects, each of the countervailing marginal effects across the four quartile groups 
would cancel each other out, making the main effect coefficient indifferent from zero.  
The abovementioned empirical explanation of the nonsupport for Hypothesis 1 is also in 
line with the theoretical foundation of our paper where we underscore the intrinsic substitutional 
relationship between the firm-specific value appropriation capability and the IPR regime of an 
environment. More specifically, when not explicitly considering the substitutional relationship, 
as in Hypothesis 1, the theoretical implications of the firm-specific value appropriation capability 
can be blurred or undetectable. However, the true theoretical implications of the firm-specific 
value appropriation capability are apparent when we explicitly consider the substitutional 
relationship in Hypothesis 2. In sum, although Hypothesis 1 is a necessary stepping stone, 
Hypothesis 2 is our main hypothesis as it subsumes the substitutional relationship and full 
theoretical logic of our paper. As such, non-support for Hypothesis 1 and support for Hypothesis 
2 corroborates our main thesis.    
Robustness Checks 
We conducted four robustness checks to examine the sensitivity of the results in our primary 
analyses. First, in addition to the interaction terms specified in Model 3 of Table III, we 
conducted a subgroup analysis in each of the four-quartile groups. That is, we ran four separate 
cross-classified logistic regressions. This subgroup analysis allowed for the control variables in 
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our models to vary from group-to-group. The results of these analyses demonstrated results 
consistent with our primary analyses.  
Second, in addition to the five-year window for the period, we specified a three-year 
window for the period. Specifically, the three-year periods covered 1997 to 1999, 2000 to 2002, 
and 2003 to 2005. Using three-year windows as a robustness check increases the confidence that 
neither the specific five-year windows we used in our primary analyses nor the actual size of the 
window drives our results. These analyses demonstrated substantively similar results.  
Third, we conducted the same analysis with the firm commercialization activity as a 
dependent variable. The results of this analysis show positive interactions between the prior 
commercialization activities and IPR protection. This overall trend—with the new dependent 
variable—shows a complementary rather than a substitutionary relationship between the prior 
commercialization activity and IPR protection. As such, this shows an entirely different 
mechanism at play (complementarities); in other words, these results are in line with the 
traditional understanding that prior experiences in a strong IPR regime predict higher likelihood 
of future investment in the same activities. Therefore, we believe that this result highlights an 
important distinction between our findings and, thus, the results further corroborate the main 
thesis of the current study that a focal firm’s downstream complementary assets (i.e., prior 
commercialization activity) can help the firm develop a firm-specific appropriation capability for 
its upstream activity (i.e., R&D activity), which it can substitute for a weak IPR regime.  
 Lastly, we consider that our primary independent variable, a firm’s regional 
commercialization, is potentially endogenous (Antonakis et al., 2010). We consider and assess 
this condition by running a propensity score matching analysis (Guo and Fraser, 2010). 
Propensity score matching estimates the effect of a treatment—regional commercialization—by 
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utilizing a set of covariates that predicts receiving the treatment (Guo and Fraser, 2010).vi In our 
case, we match the country to a number of firm-level controls: liquidity, R&D intensity, size, 
international innovative activity, and regional R&D activity. We use a minimum number of four 
matches per observation and a logit model for the treatment. The results show prior regional 
commercialization has an average treatment effect of 0.06 (p < 0.01) on the presence of R&D 
activity within a country. This provides support for an overall influence of prior 
regional commercialization on the presence of R&D within a country. In addition, as we 
maintain, more nuanced relationships occur if we consider different levels of IPR regimes. 
Unfortunately, propensity score matching does not allow for interactions. Therefore, we split the 
sample into the four quartile groups of the PIPP index, to test for effects across different levels of 
IPR protection. After doing this, we continue to see positive and statistically significant effects 
across low (Q1) (0.08, p < 0.01), moderate low (Q2) (0.08, p < 0.01), moderate high (Q3) (0.05, p 
< 0.01), and high (Q4) (0.06, p < 0.01)—with the highest effects seen at low levels of IPR 
protection. 
DISCUSSION 
The extant studies on regionalization have largely focused on the value creation aspects 
of complementary assets. Adding and thus extending the literature, we attempt to understand the 
value appropriation aspect of such activities. Toward this end, we introduce the value 
appropriation aspects of regionalization by illuminating that the regional configuration of firms’ 
value chain activities can provide complementary assets with which firms can appropriate more 
from their innovations. Specifically, we advance a framework suggesting that commercialization 
activities in a region help firms to develop a firm-specific value appropriation capability, thereby 
allowing them to appropriate more from their innovation activities even in the countries within 
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the region with weak IPR protections, as the firm-specific value appropriation capability is in a 
substitutional relationship with the IPR environment. 
Returning to the examples given in our Introduction, we discussed firms’ geographic 
entry into the foreign markets of Chile, Vietnam, and Costa Rica through upstream activities—
specifically R&D—and how these environments were especially risky for knowledge leakage 
and threats of imitation as all of these countries do not have strong IPR protections. With this 
research, we offer an answer to the puzzling empirical pattern of geographic entry. Our theory 
and results identify an alternative mechanism with which firms can protect their intellectual 
property in weak IPR environments. Thus, some firms really are fearlessly swimming upstream 
to risky waters. 
Theoretical Implications 
In this paper, we examine the role of geographic entry in innovation. Although scholars have 
explored entry decisions for decades, research on the relationship between entry and innovation 
is scarce (Zachary et al., 2015). Our theoretical analysis combines the technology management 
literature’s complementary assets framework (Mitchell, 1989, 1991; Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997) 
with the international management literature’s regionalization theory and semiglobalization 
perspective (Ghemawat, 2003, 2005; Rugman and Verberke, 2004, 2007) to develop a new 
theoretical model and predictions on the role of geographic entry in the regional configuration of 
complementary assets in innovation. Researchers rarely combine these two streams of theories as 
they largely address separate audiences. Thus, our illumination of unrealized theoretical 
synergies by joining the two streams of theories together results in greater explanatory power and 
a new, shared conversation between a larger swath of researchers across the international and 
technology management literatures. Our study offers several theoretical implications.   
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We extend the extant literature on regionalization that has focused on the value creation 
aspect to now include the previously unaddressed value appropriation aspect. For this purpose, 
we distinguish and contrast two aspects of complementary assets. The first underscores a 
synergistic facet and thus value creating aspect of complementary assets. The second is the value 
appropriation aspect of complementary assets expounded in Teece’s (1986) seminal work. We 
theorize on the downstream activities (i.e. commercialization activities) in a region and the 
subsequent upstream activities (i.e. R&D activities) in a country within that region. We maintain 
that operating regionally through commercialization activities provides complementary assets to 
the R&D activities with which firms can appropriate more from their innovations. We 
concentrate on the role of the regional configuration of co-specialized DCAs in assisting firms to 
develop a firm-specific value appropriation capability, in consideration of its substitutional role 
in weak appropriability regimes. From this perspective, our non-finding for Hypothesis 1 is, in 
fact, in line with the insightful points made by Teece (1986) in his groundbreaking paper, where 
he delineates the substitutional relationship between DCAs and the IPR environment. As such, 
since the DCAs cannot be separated from the environment in which they are operating, any 
theoretical argument must recognize the intrinsic interdependence between the two mechanisms 
for value appropriation.  
Our findings also contribute to the conversation shared by both academia and the popular 
press regarding the realized ‘globalization’ of firms relative to the intermediate view, or 
‘semiglobalization’ perspective (Cairncross, 2001; Friedman, 1999, 2005; Ghemawat, 2003, 
2005; Rugman and Verberke, 2004, 2007). Regionalization scholars argue that although MNEs 
are a driving force in globalization, with respect to the manner of increasing economic 
interdependence among national markets, data on the activities of MNEs show that few have 
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actually achieved global scope themselves (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004). Our results advance 
that, in addition to the country-level effects, the geographic configuration of value creating 
activities across countries within a region does influence a firm’s entry decision into one of the 
countries in the region for its R&D activities. Our multilevel theory and empirical specifications 
enable us to address these apparently complex relationships between countries and regions where 
the former is nested into the latter. Thus, our findings confirm that regionalization theory and the 
semiglobalization view provide a new and valuable lens of inquiry into the recent geographic 
entry empirical patterns of innovative activity. 
Our cross-classified multilevel analysis also contributes to the management literature, 
both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, studies on regionalization and our multilevel 
theory introduced in the current study build on the very important mechanism that MNCs are 
nomadic, seeking location-specific advantages across countries nested within regions. In fact, the 
mobility of MNCs across countries is one of the fundamental building blocks of many theories in 
international business. As such, while countries nest within the regions, MNCs do not, 
suggesting that the phenomenon of interest is in a cross-classified rather than a nested structure. 
Empirically, therefore, testing a theory for the cross-classified multilevel phenomenon 
necessitates use of corresponding statistical techniques. Employing the regular techniques 
designed to analyze the nested structure would provide biased results. More specifically, 
employing the regular multilevel choice model designed to analyze a phenomenon with the 
nested structure would statistically limit the geographic scope of MNCs’ operations to 
confinement within their home region precisely because of the nested structure of the statistical 
technique. As such, the statistical technique employed in the current study introduces a more 
advanced and appropriate statistical test for the management field to properly accommodate the 
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fundamental theoretical and empirical nature of the phenomenon, and thereby, an opportunity to 
facilitate new and more complex multilevel theory building. 
We also offer that our theory and results make a contribution by addressing a ‘big 
question’ (Buckley and Ghauri, 2004) as we respond to Dunning’s (1998, p. 46) call that ‘the 
changing extent, character and geography of MNE activities…is demanding an explanation’ by 
management scholars. We offer a theoretically grounded answer with a multilevel theory that 
draws on the regionalization theory and the semiglobalization perspective, normally recognized 
as content unique to the international management discipline (Ghemawat, 2003). Thus, we 
believe our study offers a new exchange in a now shared conversation between the technology 
management and international management literatures.  
Practical Implications 
There are several practical implications to our study. First, our theory and results show that firms 
organizing regionally through their downstream activities (commercialization) provides 
complementary assets to their upstream activities—specifically R&D activities in a country 
within that region—allowing them to appropriate more from their innovations. Moreover, 
regional downstream commercialization activities can substitute for weak IPR regimes, thereby 
providing the firm with an alternative mechanism for protecting its intellectual property in weak 
IPR countries. Our identification of the firm-specific value appropriation capability and its 
relationship to intellectual property protection in different IPR environments should encourage 
managers to rethink countries they have previously avoided but want to enter with R&D 
activities to fuel their innovative processes. For example, firms faced a dilemma earlier if they 
wanted to enter a weak IPR protection country with country-specific factors not available 
anywhere else and that could substantially enhance their competitive advantage (e.g., the 
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rainforest countries for tropical disease research) (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). Should you swim 
upstream to risky waters? Our research offers an answer to that question: You should not unless 
you are equipped with the firm-specific value appropriation capability that you can substitute for 
the weak IPR protection of the country. This allows you to fearlessly swim upstream to risky 
waters.  
Second, from a competitive dynamics perspective, firms need to be cautious to the 
situation where competitors with high levels of commercialization in a region could also 
collocate their R&D activities. This would allow competitors to gain synergies and exclusive 
appropriation benefits. Therefore, the combination of R&D activity with commercialization 
activity might serve as a future barrier of entry that could help sustain a competitive advantage 
for competitors. Recognizing this potential condition, managers may work to safeguard their 
competitive position.  
Third, while we show that entering regionally through commercialization activity can 
lead to more country-level R&D activity, managers could consider increasing commercialization 
activities (and co-specialized DCAs) in regions where they have already entered with R&D 
activity. This would provide two benefits of complementarity assets: intellectual property 
protection and synergies. This recommendation is particularly important if firms have already 
entered their R&D activities in countries with weak IPR regimes.  
Opportunities for Future Research 
This study allows for several opportunities for future research. First, we use a single industry to 
test our theory. While there are a number of benefits to single-industry studies—for example, 
consistency in measurement and controlling for potential influences from industry structure 
(Ahuja et al., 2008)—there might be important differences across other industries. Thus, future 
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research might consider testing our theory using different industries. Furthermore, future 
research might consider building on our theory by considering how different industry 
characteristics, such as munificence, influence regionalization theory, and the semiglobalization 
perspective. Second, we chose to focus our study on the internationalization of R&D because of 
the recent geographic entry empirical patterns and its importance and susceptibility to intellectual 
property limitations in countries. There are, however, a number of different activities within the 
value chain that call for exploration in the domain of geographic entry using the 
upstream/downstream framework. These could include country sales or financing activities. 
Future studies could explore the geographic entry of these different activities by building and 
testing theory on how different activities could behave differently from R&D. In addition, 
upcoming research could extend the discrete choice approach taken in the current study and 
consider among various choices a particular firm has to conduct its R&D activities.vii 
CONCLUSION 
We identify an alternative mechanism with which firms can protect their intellectual property in 
weak IPR environments that we refer to as the firm-specific value appropriation capability. We 
also find that the firm-specific value appropriation capability is in a substitutional relationship 
with the IPR regime of an environment, in line with Teece (1986). Our theory and results 
establish a new answer to the puzzling empirical pattern of geographic entry. Thus, some firms 
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Constructs, Variables, and Measurements 





R&D activity of a firm 
in a country  
A binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm 
conducted drug discovery and 
development activities in the particular 
country, 0 otherwise 
AdisInsight 




activity of a firm in a 
region† 
A binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm 
had launched a drug in the region during 
the prior period, 0 otherwise 
AdisInsight 
 Region Intellectual property 
right protection  
Pharmaceutical IP Protection (PIPP) 
index of the region (GDP weighted) 
Liu and La 
Croix  (2015) 
     
Control Firm Firm’s slack resources Current ratio—a firm’s current assets 
divided by its current liabilities 
Compustat 
 Firm R&D intensity† R&D expenditure divided by assets Compustat 
 Firm Firm size† Natural logarithm of assets  
 Firm Firm’s total R&D 
activity† 
The number of drug discovery and 
development activities of the firm 
AdisInsight 
 Country Patenting activity Natural logarithm of the number of 
patent applications in the country 
World Bank 
(2015) 




 Country Country’s total R&D 
activity† 
The number of drug discovery and 





activity of a firm in a 
country†  
A binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm 
had launched a drug in the particular 





Prior R&D activity of a 
firm in a country†  
A binary indicator equal to 1 if a firm 
had conducted drug discovery and 
development activities in the particular 





Prior R&D activity of a 
firm in a region† 
A binary indicator equal to 1 if a firm 
had conducted drug discovery and 
development activities in the region 








Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  Variables Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) Firm-Country: R&D activity of a firm in a country  0.12 0.32 1                         
(2) Firm: Firm slack resources 3.56 2.47 -0.11 1                       
(3) Firm: R&D intensity 0.22 0.27 -0.11 0.38 1                     
(4) Firm: Firm size 6.61 2.37 0.24 -0.46 -0.65 1                   
(5) Firm: Firm’s total R&D activity 128.04 228.11 0.31 -0.28 -0.2 0.56 1                 
(6) Country: Patenting activity 6.14 4.30 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1               
(7) Country: GDP growth 4.90 2.83 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 1             
(8) Country: Country’s total R&D activity 278.02 1478.11 0.28 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.26 -0.15 1           
(9) Firm-Country: Prior commercialization activity of a firm in a country 0.09 0.28 0.43 -0.13 -0.12 0.26 0.35 0.24 -0.13 0.22 1         
(10) Firm-Country: Prior R&D activity of a firm in a country 0.09 0.29 0.71 -0.11 -0.10 0.22 0.30 0.26 -0.16 0.31 0.51 1       
(11) Firm-Region: Prior R&D activity of a firm in a region 0.27 0.45 0.45 -0.16 -0.13 0.31 0.38 0.24 -0.05 0.17 0.40 0.52 1     
(12) Firm-Region: Prior commercialization activity of a firm in a region 0.23 0.42 0.38 -0.22 -0.22 0.41 0.47 0.19 -0.03 0.11 0.56 0.41 0.61 1   
(13) Region: Intellectual property right protection  2.11 1.02 0.28 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.31 -0.22 0.32 0.25 0.30 0.33 0.26 1 





Results of Cross-Classified Multilevel Logistic Regression  
Predicting Firm R&D Activity within a Country 
 
Variables Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  
Firm: Firm slack resources 0.09 (0.07)  0.09 (0.06)  0.09 (0.07) 
Firm: R&D intensity 0.65 (0.69)  0.61 (0.75)  0.59 (0.78) 
Firm: Firm size 0.33*** (0.10)  0.33** (0.11)  0.33** (0.11) 
Firm: Firm’s total R&D activity 0.00*** (0.00)  0.00*** (0.00)  0.00*** (0.00) 
Country: Patenting activity 0.24*** (0.03)  0.23*** (0.03)  0.15*** (0.04) 
Country: GDP growth -0.18*** (0.04)  -0.17*** (0.04)  -0.15*** (0.04) 
Country: Country’s total R&D activity 0.00* (0.00)  0.00* (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
Firm-Country: Prior commercialization activity of a firm in a country -0.50*** (0.14)  -0.52*** (0.14)  -0.46** (0.15) 
Firm-Country: Prior R&D activity of a firm in a country 3.86*** (0.14)  3.85*** (0.14)  3.85*** (0.14) 
Firm-Region: Prior R&D activity of a firm in a region 0.36** (0.13)  0.34** (0.13)  0.37** (0.13) 
         
Firm-Region: Prior commercialization activity of a firm in a region    0.03 (0.14)  0.37+ (0.21) 
Region: Intellectual property right (IPR) protection     0.39* (0.17)    
         
Second quartile group of IPR protection (Q2)       0.35 (0.33) 
Third quartile group of IPR protection (Q3)       1.10** (0.37) 
Fourth quartile group of IPR protection (Q4)       1.85*** (0.34) 
         
Prior commercialization activity of a firm in a region × Q2       -0.09 (0.27) 
Prior commercialization activity of a firm in a region × Q3       -0.61* (0.28) 
Prior commercialization activity of a firm in a region × Q4       -0.61* (0.24) 
         
Constant -8.49*** (0.89)  -9.31*** (1.00)  -8.79*** (1.02) 
         
Random-Effect Variance (firm-level) 2.45***   2.44***   2.49***  
Random-Effect Variance (regional-level) 0.58   0.37   1.79+  
Random-Effect Variance (country-level ) 0.94***   0.95***   0.58***  
         
Variance Partition Coefficient (firm-level) 0.34   0.35   0.31  
Variance Partition Coefficient (regional-level) 0.08   0.05   0.22  
Variance Partition Coefficient (country-level) 0.13   0.13   0.07  
Variance Partition Coefficient (observation) 0.45   0.47   0.40  
         
Observations 16,204   16,204   16,204  
The parameter point estimates and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are the means and standard deviations of the MCMC parameter chains (see Appendix A for details);  




APPENDIX A: ANALYSIS DETAILS 
Let 𝜋𝑖,𝑗𝑘 denote the probability that firm 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁) innovates in country 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽) in 
region 𝑘 (𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾). We separate the firm index from the country and region indices by a 
comma to indicate their cross-classification as opposed to the standard hierarchical case where 
each firm operates in a single country and region. The cross-classified multilevel logistic 
regression model for the log-odds of innovating is as follows: 
logit(𝜋𝑖,𝑗𝑘) ≡ log (
𝜋𝑖,𝑗𝑘
1 − 𝜋𝑖,𝑗𝑘
)  = 𝐱𝑖,𝑗𝑘
′ 𝛃 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘 
where 𝐱𝑖,𝑗𝑘 is a vector of firm-, country-, and regional-level covariates with regression 
coefficient vector 𝛃. Exponentiating the regression coefficients results in odds ratios. The 𝑓𝑖, 𝑐𝑗𝑘 
and 𝑟𝑘 are random-intercept effects representing remaining unobserved firm, country, and 
regional influences. These effects are assumed mutually independent, independent of the 
covariates, and normally distributed with zero means and constant variances 𝑓𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑓
2), 
𝑐𝑗𝑘~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑐
2), and 𝑟𝑘~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑟
2). The random effect variances 𝜎𝑓
2, 𝜎𝑐
2 and 𝜎𝑟
2 summarize the 
extent of unobserved heterogeneity across firms, countries, and regions, respectively. These 
variances are typically rescaled to be Variance Partition Coefficients (VPCs) defined as the 
proportions of the total residual variance derived from the latent response formulation of the 
model (Goldstein et al., 2002). Specifically, each variance is divided by 𝜎𝑓
2 + 𝜎𝑐
2 + 𝜎𝑟
2 + 3.29, 
where 3.29 is the variance of the standard logistic distribution. 
We fit all models by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods as implemented in 
the MLwiN software (Browne, 2012; Rasbash et al., 2009). We call MLwiN from within Stata 
using the user-written runmlwin command (Leckie and Charlton, 2013). We specify diffuse 
(vague, flat, or minimally informative) prior distributions for all parameters. We obtain starting 
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values from naïve two-level models fitted by maximum likelihood estimation that ignore the 
country-level and regional-level clustering. We run all models using a burn-in period of 2,500 
iterations and a monitoring period of 25,000 iterations. Visual assessments of the parameter 
chains and standard MCMC convergence diagnostics suggest that the length of these periods is 
sufficient. Quantile-quantile plots of the predicted random effects confirm normality assumptions 
are reasonable. We report the posterior means and standard deviations (SDs) of the 25,000 
monitoring iterations. These quantities are analogous to the parameter estimates and standard 
errors from a frequentist analysis. We report p-values calculated from these quantities in the 
conventional way, therefore p-values for the variance components are approximate due to the 




TABLE AI: List of Countries and Regions 
Countries Regions      Countries Regions 
Australia Australia and New Zealand      Chile South America 
New Zealand Australia and New Zealand      Colombia South America 
Cuba Caribbean      Ecuador South America 
Dominican Republic Caribbean      Paraguay South America 
Haiti Caribbean      Peru South America 
Jamaica Caribbean      Uruguay South America 
Trinidad and Tobago Caribbean      Venezuela South America 
Costa Rica Central America      Bangladesh South-Central Asia 
El Salvador Central America      India South-Central Asia 
Guatemala Central America      Iran South-Central Asia 
Honduras Central America      Kazakhstan South-Central Asia 
Mexico Central America      Kyrgyzstan South-Central Asia 
Nicaragua Central America      Nepal South-Central Asia 
Panama Central America      Pakistan South-Central Asia 
Kenya Eastern Africa      Sri Lanka South-Central Asia 
Madagascar Eastern Africa      Uzbekistan South-Central Asia 
Malawi Eastern Africa      Cambodia South-Eastern Asia 
Mozambique Eastern Africa      Indonesia South-Eastern Asia 
Tanzania Eastern Africa      Laos South-Eastern Asia 
Uganda Eastern Africa      Malaysia South-Eastern Asia 
Zambia Eastern Africa      Myanmar South-Eastern Asia 
Zimbabwe Eastern Africa      Philippines South-Eastern Asia 
China Eastern Asia      Singapore South-Eastern Asia 
Japan Eastern Asia      Thailand South-Eastern Asia 
South Korea Eastern Asia      Vietnam South-Eastern Asia 
Belarus Eastern Europe      South Africa Southern Africa 
Bulgaria Eastern Europe      Croatia Southern Europe 
Czech Republic Eastern Europe      Greece Southern Europe 
Hungary Eastern Europe      Italy Southern Europe 
Moldova Eastern Europe      Portugal Southern Europe 
Poland Eastern Europe      Serbia Southern Europe 
Romania Eastern Europe      Spain Southern Europe 
Russia Eastern Europe      Burkina Faso Western Africa 
Slovak Republic Eastern Europe      Gambia Western Africa 
Ukraine Eastern Europe      Ghana Western Africa 
Cameroon Middle Africa      Ivory Coast Western Africa 
Congo Middle Africa      Niger Western Africa 
Gabon Middle Africa      Nigeria Western Africa 
Algeria Northern Africa      Senegal Western Africa 
Egypt Northern Africa      Togo Western Africa 
Libya Northern Africa      Armenia Western Asia 
Morocco Northern Africa      Cyprus Western Asia 
Sudan Northern Africa      Iraq Western Asia 
Tunisia Northern Africa      Israel Western Asia 
Canada Northern America      Jordan Western Asia 
United States Northern America      Kuwait Western Asia 
Denmark Northern Europe      Lebanon Western Asia 
Estonia Northern Europe      Oman Western Asia 
Finland Northern Europe      Saudi Arabia Western Asia 
Iceland Northern Europe      Syria Western Asia 
Ireland Northern Europe      Turkey Western Asia 
Latvia Northern Europe      United Arab Emirates Western Asia 
Lithuania Northern Europe      Austria Western Europe 
Norway Northern Europe      Belgium Western Europe 
Sweden Northern Europe      France Western Europe 
United Kingdom Northern Europe      Germany Western Europe 
Argentina South America      Luxembourg Western Europe 
Bolivia South America      Netherlands Western Europe 
Brazil South America      Switzerland Western Europe 
Note: 118 countries in 18 regions; we employ the M49 standard or the United Nations Statistics Division’s (UNSD) ‘Standard country or area 






i Teece (1986) defines co-specialized assets as the most specific and tailored assets to the innovation, where 
specialized assets are less extreme in their degree of specialization.  
ii The combination of upstream activity with DCAs is synergistic to both, meaning that complementarity exists as 
raising one activity increases the return to raising the other activity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). Moreover, the 
authors (p. 183) clarify that ‘complementarity is symmetric: If doing more of activity a raises the value of increases 
in activity b, then increasing b also raises the value of increasing a.’ 
iii We follow the definition provided by Petersen and Rajan (2002, p. 2533) where, ‘By soft information, we mean 
something similar to what is termed “tacit” information (see Polanyi (1958)-information that is hard to communicate 
to others, let alone capture in written documents’.  
iv We employ the M49 standard or the United Nations Statistics Division’s (UNSD) ‘Standard country or area codes 
for statistical use (M49)’. 
v We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
vi Propensity score matching is a method estimates the average treatment effect from observed data by assessing the 
differences between observed and potential outcomes for each subject. The potential outcomes are assessed by using 
the average of outcomes of similar subjects that receive the other treatment level. In our case, we used a minimum 
matching of four firms. Firms were required to match using a caliper matching method (Guo and Fraser, 2010). 
Calipers represent the absolute distance of propensity scores between two cases. In our case, we specified that each 
match had to have a caliper less than 0.10. This indicates that our matching requires differences to be less than a 
tenth of a standard deviation of the sample estimated propensity scores. This is well below Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983)’s recommendation of 0.25—which is also suggested by Guo and Fraser (2010). We get similar results if we 
relax this constraint to their recommended level of 0.25. 
vii We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
                                                 
